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Abstract
Adversarial training is a common approach to im-
proving the robustness of deep neural networks
against adversarial examples. In this work, we
propose a novel regularization approach as an al-
ternative. To derive the regularizer, we formu-
late the adversarial robustness problem under the
robust optimization framework and approximate
the loss function using a second-order Taylor se-
ries expansion. Our proposed second-order ad-
versarial regularizer (SOAR) is an upper bound
based on the Taylor approximation of the inner-
max in the robust optimization objective. We
empirically show that the proposed method im-
proves the robustness of networks on the CIFAR-
10 dataset.
1. Introduction
Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) is the standard ap-
proach for improving the robustness of deep neural net-
works (DNN), or any other estimator, against adversarial
attacks. It is a data augmentation method that adds adver-
sarial examples to the training set and updates the network
with newly added data points. Intuitively, this procedure en-
courages the DNN not to make the same mistakes against
an adversary. By adding sufficiently enough adversarial ex-
amples, the network gradually becomes robust to adversar-
ial attacks. Note that Schmidt et al. (2018) show that under
a Gaussian data model, the sample complexity of robust
generalization is
√
d times larger than that of standard gen-
eralization. They further suggest that current datasets (e.g.,
CIFAR-10) may not be large enough to attain higher ad-
versarial accuracy. Being a data augmentation procedure,
however, is an indirect way to improve the robustness of
a DNN. An alternative, which we pursue here, is to de-
fine a regularizer that penalizes DNN parameters that are
prune to adversarial attacks. Minimizing the regularized
loss function leads to estimators that are robust to adversar-
ial attacks.
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Adversarial training and the proposed method can both
be understood in terms of robust optimization formu-
lation for adversarial robustness (Ben-Tal et al., 2009;
Madry et al., 2017; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Shaham et al.,
2018; Sinha et al., 2017). In this formulation, one is seek-
ing to find a parameter w that minimizes
min
w
E
[
max
δ∈∆
ℓ(X + δ, Y ;w)
]
, (1)
where ℓ is the loss function and ∆ is the set from which
an adversary can choose its attack (we formally define all
relevant quantities in Section 3). Adversarial training can
be understood as approximating the solution of the inner
maximization by finding perturbations with some specific
attack technique, e.g., 7-step PGD (Madry et al., 2017).
This is then followed by gradient descent on the loss com-
puted at the perturbed input x + δ. Note that as the value
of maxδ∈∆ ℓ(x + δ, x;w) depends on w, the perturbation
found for an older w may not be a good attack for a newer
w.
Our proposed method is more direct. It is based on ap-
proximating the loss ℓ(x + δ, x;w) using its Taylor se-
ries expansion (i.e., ℓ(x + δ) ≈ ℓ(x) + ∇ℓ(x)⊤δ +
1
2δ
⊤∇2ℓ(x)δ, for a second order expansion), and then up-
per bounding the inner maximization problem of (1) using
the Taylor series approximation. That is, we approximately
solve maxδ∈∆
[
ℓ(x) +∇ℓ(x)⊤δ + 12δ⊤∇2ℓ(x)δ
]
. In our
derivations, we use the second-order expansion of the loss
function, which leads to an expansion that includes both
gradient and Hessian of the loss function with respect to
(w.r.t.) the input. We call the method Second-Order Ad-
versarial Regularizer (SOAR) (not to be confused with the
Soar cognitive architecture Laird 2012). There are several
steps that should be taken before this idea becomes practi-
cal. We describe them in details in Section 4. Our contribu-
tion are
• We show that an over-parameterized linear regression
model can be severely affected by an adversary, even
though its loss function is zero. A regularization-
based approach can robustify such a model, suggest-
ing that one can in general use a regularization-based
approach instead of adversarial training (Section 2).
• We derive a regularizer that approximates the inner
maximization of the robust optimization formulation,
hence help improving the robustness of learned model
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against adversarial attacks (Section 4).
• We empirically study the proposed regularizer and
show that training with such a regularizer can sig-
nificantly improve the adversarial robustness of the
network (Section 5). The suggested regularizer has
smaller negative effect on the standard accuracy (clean
data), compared to adversarial training based on PGD.
2. Linear Regression with Over-parametrized
Model: A Motivating Example
We consider a linear regression problem with over-
parameterized model in order to show the possibility of us-
ing explicit regularization, instead of adversarial training.
Consider a linear model fw(x) = 〈w , x 〉 with x,w ∈ Rd.
Suppose that w∗ = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)⊤ and the distribution of
x ∼ p is such that it is confined on a 1-dimensional sub-
space { (x1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) : x1 ∈ R }. So the density of x
is p ((x1, . . . , xd)) = p1(x1)δ(x2)δ(x3) . . . δ(xd), where
δ(·) is Dirac’s delta function. This setup can be thought of
as using an over-parameterized model that has many irrele-
vant dimensions with data that is only covering the relevant
dimension of the input space.
Let us consider the standard squared error pointwise loss
l(x;w) = 12 |〈x , w 〉 − 〈x , w∗ 〉|2. Denote the residual by
r(x;w) = 〈x , w − w∗ 〉. The population loss is L(w) =
E [l(X ;w)] = 12E
[
|〈X , w 〉 − 〈X , w∗ 〉|2
]
.
Suppose that we use gradient descent (GD) to find the
minimizer of this loss function. Furthermore, let us as-
sume that we compute the gradient based on the popula-
tion loss, instead of the empirical loss, in order to avoid
any finite sample concern. We initialize the weights at
the first time step as w(0) ∼ N(0, σ2Id×d), though the
conclusions would not change much with other distribu-
tions. The GD procedure updates the weights according
to w(t + 1)← w(t)− β∇wL(w)
The partial derivatives are
∂L(w)
∂wj
=
{∫
(w1 − w∗1)p1(x1)xdx = (w1 − w∗1)µ1,∫
(wj − w∗j )δ(xj)xdx = (wj − w∗j )0 = 0, j 6= 1.
where µ1 = E [X1]. Notice that the gradient in dimen-
sion j = 1 is non-zero, unless (w1 − w∗1)µ1 = 0. As-
suming that µ1 6= 0, this implies that the gradient won’t
be zero unless w1 = w
∗
1 . On the other hand, the gradients
in dimensions j = 2, . . . , d are all zero, so the GD proce-
dure does not change the value of wj(t) for j = 2, . . . , d.
Therefore, under the proper choice of learning rate β, we
get that the asymptotic solution of GD solution is w¯ ,
limr→∞ w(t) = (w∗1 , w2(0), w3(0), . . . , wd(0))
⊤.
We make two observations. The first is that L(w¯) = 0, i.e.,
the population loss is zero. So from the perspective of train-
ing under the original loss, we are finding the right solution,
even though the weights in dimensions 2 to d are the same
as the randomly selected initial weights. The second obser-
vation is that we can easily attack this model by perturbing
x by∆x = (0,∆x2,∆x3, . . . ,∆xd)
⊤. The pointwise loss
at x+∆x is
l(x+∆x;w) =
1
2
|(w1 − w∗1)x1 + 〈w , ∆x 〉|2
=
1
2
|r(x;w) + 〈w , ∆x 〉|2 .
With the choice of ∆xi = ε sign(wi(0)) (for i = 2, . . . , d)
and ∆x1 = 0, an FGSM-like attack (Goodfellow et al.,
2014) at the learned weight w¯ leads to the pointwise loss
of
l(x+∆x; w¯) =
1
2
ε2
[ d∑
j=2
|wj(0)|
]2
≈ 1
2
ε2 ‖w(0)‖21 .
In order to get a better sense of this loss, we compute its ex-
pected value w.r.t. the randomness of weight initialization.
We have that (including the extra |w1(0)| term too)
EW∼N(0,σ2Id×d)
[
‖W‖21
]
= E

 d∑
i,j=1
|Wi||Wj |

 =
d∑
i=1
E
[|Wi|2]+ d∑
i,j=1,i6=j
E [|Wi|]E [|Wj |] ,
where we used the independence of the r.v. Wi and Wj
when i 6= j. The expectation E [|Wi|2] is the variance σ2
ofWi. The r.v. |Wj | has a folded normal distribution, and
its expectation E [|Wj |] is
√
2
π
σ. Thus, we get that
EW∼N(0,σ2Id×1)
[
‖W‖21
]
= dσ2 + d(d− 1) 2
π
σ2 ≈ 2
π
d2σ2,
for d ≫ 1. The expected population loss of the specified
adversarial attack∆x at the asymptotic solution w¯ is
EX,W [l(X +∆x); w¯)] ≈ O(ε2d2σ2).
We see that when the dimension is large, this loss can be
quite significant. The culprit here is that the GD procedure
does not force the initial weights of this over-parameterized
model to go to zero when there is no data from irrelevant to
the task (or unused) dimensions.
The conventional strategy to increase the robustness of
an estimator against adversarial attacks is through ad-
versarial training, which is to add the adversarial ex-
amples to the training data and retraining the estima-
tor. In this example, the adversarial training recipe sug-
gests adding data points in the form of x + ∆x =
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(x1, ε sign(w2(0)), . . . , ε sign(wd(0)))
⊤ to the training set
(assuming we are using a finite training set as opposed to
the population gradient). Even though this is feasible, and
is in fact the standard approach, it may not be considered
an elegant approach for this particular problem.
A more elegant approach, one may argue, is to notice that
the reason an adversary can attack the learned model is that
GD did not make the weights of irrelevant dimensions go
to zero. This suggests that one might use some form of reg-
ularization in order to encourage the weights of irrelevant
dimensions going to zero. A generic regularizer is to use
the ℓ2-norm of the weights, i.e., formulate the problem as
a ridge regression. In that case, the regularized population
loss is
Lridge(w) =
1
2
E
[
|〈X , w 〉 − 〈X , w∗ 〉|2
]
+
λ
2
‖w‖22 .
One can see that the solution of ∇wLridge(w) = 0 is
w¯1(λ) =
µ1
µ1+λ
w∗1 and w¯j(λ) = 0 for j 6= 1. The use of
this generic regularizer seems reasonable in this example,
but we may wonder if it is possible to define a regularizer
that is specially-designed for improving the adversarial ro-
bustness. This is what we do here in order to motivate the
general development in Section 4.
Let us assume that a particular adversary attacks the model
by adding ∆x = (0, ε sign(w2(0)), . . . , ε sign(wd(0))
⊤.
The expected loss is then
Lrobustified(w) , E [l(X +∆x;w)] =
1
2
E


∣∣∣∣∣∣r(x;w) + ε
d∑
j=2
|wj |
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2

 =
L(w) + ε2 ‖w2:d‖21 + εE [r(X ;w)] ‖w2:d‖1 , (2)
where ‖w2:d‖1 =
∑d
j=2 |wj |.1 Minimizing Lrobustified(w)
is the same as minimizing the model at the point x′ = x +
∆x of the adversarial perturbation. The new regularizer
ε2 ‖w2:d‖21+εE [r(X ;w)] ‖w2:d‖1 already incorporates the
effect of adversary in exact form.
Nonetheless, there are two limitations of this approach.
The first one is that it is designed for a particular choice
of adversarial attack, an FGSM-like one. We would like
a regularizer that is robust to a larger class of attacks. The
second is that this regularizer is designed for a linear model
and squared loss. How can we design a regularizer that can
be used for more complicated models, such as DNNs? We
address these questions by formulating the problem of ad-
versarial robustness within the robust optimization frame-
work (Section 3), and propose an approach to approxi-
mately solve it (Section 4).
1A similar, but more complicated result, would hold if the ad-
versary could also attack the first dimension.
3. Robust Optimization Formulation for
Adversarial Robustness
Designing an adversarial robust estimator can be formu-
lated as a robust optimization problem, as shown by
(Madry et al., 2017; Wong & Kolter, 2018). To describe
it, let us introduce our notations first. Consider an in-
put space X ⊂ Rd, an output space Y , and a parame-
ter (or hypothesis) spaceW , which parameterizes a model
f : X ×W → Y . In the supervised learning scenario, we
are given a dataset in the form ofDn = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 with
(Xi, Yi) ∼ µ. Given the prediction of f(x;w) and a tar-
get value y, the pointwise loss function of the model is de-
noted by ℓ(x, y;w) , ℓ(f(x;w), y). Examples of the loss
functions are the squared error for the regression problem
and the cross-entropy loss for classification problem. Given
the distribution of data, one can define the population loss
(or risk) as L(w) = E [ℓ(X,Y ;w)]. The goal of the stan-
dard supervised learning problem is to use the dataset Dn
in order to find a w ∈ W that minimizes the population
loss. A generic approach to do this is through empirical risk
minimization (ERM). In order to control the complexity of
the hypothesis, thus avoiding over- or under-fitting, regular-
ization, explicitly or implicitly, is often used (Gyo¨rfi et al.,
2002; Steinwart & Christmann, 2008).
As shown in the previous section, it is possible to find a
parameter w that makes this loss function very small, but
leads to a model that is quite vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks. In order to improve the robustness of an estimator
to adversarial attacks, we should be looking for parame-
ters that make the loss function small while being robust to
adversarial perturbations. We would like to put some con-
straints on the power of adversary (e.g., making sure that
the amount of perturbation is not too large); otherwise, we
cannot hope to have any robustness towards attacks. This
can be specified by limiting that the adversary can only
modify any input x to x + δ with δ ∈ ∆ ⊂ X . Com-
monly used constraints are ε-balls w.r.t. ℓp-norms, though
other constraint sets have been used too (Wong et al., 2019).
This goal can be formulated as a robust optimization prob-
lem where the objective is to minimize the adversarial pop-
ulation loss given some perturbation constraint∆:
min
w
E(X,Y )∼µ
[
max
δ∈∆
ℓ(X + δ, Y ;w)
]
. (3)
We have an interplay between two goals: 1) the inner-max
term looks for the worst-case loss around the input, while 2)
the outer-min term optimizes the hypothesis by minimizing
such a risk.
The adversarial training can be intuitively understood as an
approximation of this min-max problem. Instead of solv-
ing the inner-max problem, which is often computation-
ally difficult, one may approximate it with another loss
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that is obtained from a particular attack, perhaps under
some computational budget. If we denote the perturba-
tion generated by a particular adversary at x by δˆ(x), we
are effectively approximating maxδ∈∆ ℓ(x + δ, y;w) by
ℓ(x + δˆ(x), y;w). It is clear that for any δˆ ∈ ∆, we have
E
[
ℓ(X + δˆ(X), Y ;w)
]
≤ E [maxδ∈∆ ℓ(X + δ, Y ;w)].
A common class of adversarial attacks are gradient-based
attacks, such as FGSM, BIM and PGD, that utilize gradi-
ent (first-order) information of the network to compute per-
turbations (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016;
Madry et al., 2017). They are simple and very effective
attack techniques, especially when the perturbation is ℓp-
bounded. In particular, it has been shown that local loss
maxima found by PGD have similar loss values, even with
a large number of random restarts (Madry et al., 2017).
This observation motivates the use of such attack method
to approximate the solution of the inner-max problem.
As shown in Section 2, one can design a regularizer that
provides the value of the loss function at the adversarially-
attacked point, cf. (2). In that section, we focused on a
particular model, loss function, and adversary. Such a reg-
ularizer relieved us from using a separate inner optimiza-
tion procedure, as is done in adversarial training. Moti-
vated by that example and the robust optimization frame-
work discussed in this section, we devise a regularizer that
approximates the robust formulation without much compu-
tational overhead. This may also provide us with some in-
sight on how the adversary can be avoided, which is some-
what opaque in the adversarial training procedure.
4. Second-Order Adversarial Regularizer
(SOAR)
The main idea of SOAR is to approximate the loss function
using Taylor series expansion around an input x and then
solve the inner maximization term of the robust optimiza-
tion formulation (3) using the approximated form. Describ-
ing this idea in detail is the topic of this section.
Assuming that the loss is twice differentiable, we can ap-
proximate the loss function around input x by the second-
order Taylor expansion
ℓ(x+ δ) ≈ ℓ(x) +∇ℓ(x)⊤δ + 1
2
δ⊤∇2ℓ(x)δ. (4)
Here we drop w and y in the original loss formulation to
simplify the notation. It is important to realize that the gra-
dients are computedwith respect to the input x, i.e.,∇xℓ(x)
and∇2xℓ(x).
Let us focus on the ℓp attacks, where the constraint set in (3)
is ∆ = {δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ ε} for some ε > 0 and p ≥ 1. In
particular, let us focus on the ℓ∞ attacks. Using the second-
order Taylor series expansion, the inner optimization is
max
‖δ‖
∞
≤ε
ℓ(x) +∇ℓ(x)⊤δ + 1
2
δ⊤∇2ℓ(x)δ.
This Boolean quadratic programming (BQP) problem,
however, is NP-hard (Beasley, 1998; Lima & Grossmann,
2017). Even though there exist semi-definite programming
(SDP) relaxations, such approaches require the exact input
Hessian, which is computationally expensive to obtain for
high-dimensional inputs. And even if we could compute
the exact Hessian, SDP itself is a computationally expen-
sive approach, and perhaps not suitable to be within the in-
ner loop of a DNN training. As such, we relax the ℓ∞ con-
straint to an ℓ2 constraint, which as we shall see, leads to a
computationally efficient solution. Note that with δ ∈ Rd,
an ℓ∞ ball of size ε is enclosed by an ℓ2-ball of size
√
dε
with the same centre. Therefore, we can upper bound the
inner maximization by
max
‖δ‖
∞
≤ε
ℓ(x+ δ) ≤ max
‖δ‖
2
≤√dε
ℓ(x+ δ), (5)
which after substituting the second-order Taylor series ex-
pansion leads to an ℓ2-constrained quadratic optimization
problem
ℓ(x) + max
‖δ‖
2
≤√dε
[
∇ℓ(x)⊤δ + 1
2
δ⊤∇2ℓ(x)δ
]
.
We could maximize each term inside the
max separately and upper bound the max by
max‖δ‖
2
≤
√
dε
∇ℓ(x)⊤δ + max‖δ‖
2
≤
√
dε
1
2δ
⊤∇2ℓ(x)δ =√
dε ‖∇ℓ(x)‖2 + 12dε2σmax(∇2ℓ(x)), where
σmax(∇2ℓ(x)) is the largest singular value of the Hessian
matrix,∇2ℓ(x). Even though the norm of the gradient and
the singular value of the Hessian have an intuitive appeal,
separately optimizing these terms might lead to a looser up-
per bound than necessary. The reason is that the maximizer
of the first two terms are argmax
∣∣∇ℓ(x)⊤δ∣∣ = ∇ℓ(x)‖∇ℓ(x)‖
2
and the direction corresponding to the largest singular
value of ∇2ℓ(x). In general, these two directions are not
aligned. Solving the original optimization is easy though,
and can be achieved by combine the expansion terms into
a unified quadratic objective
ℓ(x+ δ) ≈ ℓ(x) + 1
2
[
δ
1
]⊤ [∇2ℓ(x) ∇ℓ(x)
∇ℓ(x)⊤ 1
] [
δ
1
]
− 1
2
= ℓ(x) +
1
2
δ′⊤Hδ′ − 1
2
,
where δ′ =
[
δ
1
]
and H =
[∇2ℓ(x) ∇ℓ(x)
∇ℓ(x)⊤ 1
]
. Note that
δ′ is a d+1-dimensional vector andH is a (d+1)×(d+1)
matrix.
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This allows us to conveniently derive an upper bound on
the expansion terms using the characteristics of a single
Hessian term, and we arrive at the final objective with the
perturbation in terms of ‖δ′‖2:
max
‖δ′‖
2
≤ε′
δ′⊤Hδ′ (6)
with ε′ =
√
dε2 + 1. To derive the regularizer, we use
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to obtain
max
‖δ′‖
2
≤ε′
δ′⊤Hδ′ ≤ max
‖δ′‖
2
≤ε′
∣∣δ′⊤Hδ′∣∣ ≤
max
‖δ′‖
2
≤ε′
‖δ′‖2 ‖Hδ′‖2 = ε′ max‖δ′‖
2
≤ε′
‖Hδ′‖2 = ε′2 ‖H‖2 ,
(7)
where the last equality is obtained using properties of the
ℓ2-induced matrix norm (this is the spectral norm). Since
computing ‖H‖2 would again require the exact input Hes-
sian, and we would like to avoid it, we calculate its upper
bound. The spectral norm can be upper bounded by the
Frobenius norm as ‖H‖2 = σmax(H) ≤ ‖H‖F. The Frobe-
nius norm itself satisfies
‖H‖F =
√
Tr(H⊤H) = E [‖Hz‖2] , (8)
where z ∼ N (0, I(d+1)×(d+1)). Therefore, we can esti-
mate ‖H‖F by sampling random vectors z and compute the
sample average of ‖Hz‖2.
Let us take a closer look at Hz. By decomposing z =
[zd, z1]
⊤
, we get that
Hz =
[∇2ℓ(x)zd + z1∇ℓ(x)
∇ℓ(x)⊤zd + z1
]
.
The term ∇2ℓ(x)zd in Hz is a matrix-vector product that
can be computed using Finite Difference (FD) approxima-
tion
∇2ℓ(x)zd ≈ ∇ℓ(x+ hzd)−∇ℓ(x)
h
.
Note that E [‖zd‖2] =
√
d for our normally distributed z.
This can be quite large for high dimensional data. To en-
sure that the approximation direction always has the same
magnitude, we use the normalized z˜d =
zd
‖zd‖2 instead, and
use the following FD approximation
∇2ℓ(x)zd ≈ ‖zd‖ ∇ℓ(x+ hz˜d)−∇ℓ(x)
h
. (9)
There are a few remaining details related to the possibility
of gradient masking, i.e., having a very close to zero gradi-
ent at x in the training data. This might cause a regularizer
based on ‖H‖ evaluated at x ineffective. We next study
SOAR in the simple logistic regression setting, which re-
veals why we might observe gradient masking. Based on
that insight, we provide the remaining details of the method
afterwards in Section 4.2.
4.1. SOAR for a Linear Classifier
Consider a linear classifier f : Rd × Rd → R with
f(x;w) = φ(〈w , x 〉), where x,w ∈ Rd are the input
and the weights, and φ(·) is the sigmoid function. Note
that the output of f has the interpretation of being a prob-
ability. For the cross-entropy loss function ℓ(x, y;w) =
−[y log f(x;w) + (1 − y) log(1 − f(x;w))], the gradi-
ent w.r.t. the input x is ∇ℓ(x) = (f(x;w) − y)w and
the Hessian w.r.t. the input x is ∇ℓ2(x) = f(x;w)(1 −
f(x;w))ww⊤ .
The second-order Taylor series expansion (4) with the gra-
dient and Hessian being evaluated at x is
ℓ(x+ δ) ≈ ℓ(x) + r(x, y;w)w⊤δ + 1
2
u(x;w)δ⊤ww⊤δ,
(10)
where r(x, y;w) = f(x;w) − y is the residual term de-
scribing the difference between the predicted probability
and the correct label, and u(x;w) = f(x;w)(1− f(x;w)).
Note that u has a confidence interpretation, and is close to
0 whenever the classifier is predicting a value close to 0 or
1. The upper bound on the Taylor approximation to inner
maximization (5) is
ℓ(x) + max
‖δ‖
2
≤√dε
[
r(x, y;w)w⊤δ +
1
2
u(x)δ⊤ww⊤δ
]
=
ℓ(x) + ε
√
d |r(x, y;w)| ‖w‖2 +
dε2
2
u(x;w) ‖w‖22 .
The regularization term is encouraging the norm of w to
be small, weighted according to the residual r(x, y;w) and
the uncertainty u(x;w). Whenever the classifier is correct
with a large confidence, both r and uwould be close to zero.
The result is that the effect of the regularizer would be di-
minished, i.e., the weights are no longer regularized. In
such a case, the Taylor series expansion, computed using
the gradient and Hessian evaluated at x, becomes an inac-
curate approximation to the loss, and hence its maximizer
is not a good solution to the inner maximization problem
anymore.
Note that this does not mean that one cannot use Taylor
series expansion to approximate the loss. In fact, by the
mean value theorem, there exists an h⋆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
the second-order Taylor expansion is exact: ℓ(x + δ) =
ℓ(x) +∇ℓ(x)⊤δ + 12δ⊤∇2ℓ(x + h⋆δ)δ. The issue is that
if we compute the Hessian at x (instead of at x + h⋆), our
approximation might not be very good whenever the loss
function is close to being flat at x. This suggests that we
might consider computing the gradient not at x, but at an-
other point.
4.2. Avoiding Gradient Masking
The insight from the last section suggests a few heuristics
in order to improve the quality of SOAR. The first is to
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compute the gradient and Hessian information at a point
slightly different from the data point x, to avoid the detri-
mental effect of gradient masking in the calculation of the
regularization. The second is using a randomly selected h
in the FD approximation of (9) that is not infinitesimally
small. We explain these in the rest of this section.
The discussion in Section 4.1 shows that whenever the lo-
gistic regression classifier becomes very confident in its pre-
diction (i.e., f(x;w) becomes close to 0 or 1) and predicts
the correct label too, the regularizer becomes close to zero,
and hence ineffective. Note that having a close to zero gra-
dient is not a good defence strategy because despite its ap-
parent success against iterative optimization-based attacks,
a method relying on the gradient masking can be easily cir-
cumvented (Athalye et al., 2018b). Our early experimental
results with DNNs had also indicated that gradient masking
occurred with SOAR when the gradient and Hessian were
evaluated at x. To systematically study this, we measure the
average value of the highest probability output over test set
data, that is, 1
N
∑N
n=1maxi∈1,2,...,c P (xn)i, where P (xn)i
represent the probability of class i given data xn. The result
is reported in Table 5 in the Appendix B.
To mitigate this issue, we evaluate the gradient and Hessian,
through a FD approximation (9) at a point slightly different
from the input data x. One approach is to randomly perturb
x by a stochastic noise. That is, we evaluate the gradient
and Hessian at x′ = x+η with a randomly chosen η within
the ℓ∞ ball of size ε (random initialization), where η =
(η1, η2, . . . , ηd)
⊤ and ηi ∼ U(−ε, ε). The other is to follow
one step of PGD adversary and then evaluate the gradient
and Hessian (through the FD approximation again). That
is, x′ = x+ η+ εstep∇xℓ(x+ η) for (PGD1 initialization).
We compare all variations in our experiments.
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Figure 1. Consider a classifier trained via standard techniques (i.e.
by minimizing the cross-entropy loss). We randomly select a
point from the training set and apply random perturbation η. Sup-
pose we have a linear interpolation between x and x+tη with t ∈
[0, 1.0], we show (Red) the exact loss computed at the interpolated
point: ℓ(x + tη), and the approximated loss through Taylor ex-
pansion. We consider two options for the second-order expansion
term: (Blue) we use hessian vector product computed at the center
of the expansion: ℓ(x) + t∇ℓ(x)⊤η + t
2
2
η⊤∇2ℓ(x)η, and (Red)
we use FD method ℓ(x)+ t∇ℓ(x)⊤η+ t
2‖η‖
2
η⊤∇ℓ(x+hη˜)−∇ℓ(x)
h
with η˜ = η
‖η‖
2
and step size h.
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Figure 2. After each epoch, we compute the sample average of the
regularizer in Equation 11 from 1 and 100 random directions z’s
over the training set.
The second heuristic is related to the choice of step size h in
the FD approximation (9). The conventional approach for
FD method uses a very small h in computing the forward
gradient. This leads to an accurate gradient computation.
The analysis of Section 4.1, however, shows that whenever
the classifier becomes very confident, the curvature profile
obtained at the exact centre of the Taylor series may not
lead to an accurate approximation of the loss under pertur-
bation. By choosing a larger h, however, we compute the
average slope or curvature over a larger domain, and can
potentially avoid this issue. This is empirically shown in
Figure 1, with more examples provided in the Appendix.
We observe that the Taylor series approximation that uses
the exact value of Hessian (i.e., no FD approximation) pro-
vides a poor approximation to the loss function of a DNN,
while a FD approximation with a not very small h can in
fact provide a better approximation. Based on these obser-
vations, we propose to randomly draw the step size h in our
regularizer from a uniform distribution, i.e., h ∼ U(0, α)
with an α that is not too close to zero. Since sampling h
from a uniform distribution can roughly be viewed as av-
eraging the curvature from 0 to α, this step might help in
providing more meaningful second order information.
To summarize, the regularizer evaluated at x, with a direc-
tion z, and FD step size parameter h > 0 is
R(x; z, h) =
dε2 + 1
2
∥∥∥∥
[
‖zd‖2
∇ℓ(x+hz˜d)−∇ℓ(x)
h
+ z1∇ℓ(x)
∇ℓ(x)⊤zd + z1
]∥∥∥∥
2
,
(11)
with z˜d =
zd
‖zd‖2 being the normalized direction. The
expectation in (8) can then be approximated by taking m
samples of zi drawn from zi ∼ N (0, I(d+1)×(d+1)). In
practice, we observed that a single random direction pro-
vides a close approximation to the expectation. Figure 2
compares 1
n
∑n
i=1 R(xi, zi) and
1
n
∑n
i=1
∑m
j=1R(Xi, Zj)
after each epoch, where the summation on i = 1, . . . , n is
over the training data pointsXi. Based on this observation,
the regularized pointwise objective for a data point (x, y) is
ℓSOAR(x, y) = ℓ(x
′, y;w) + λR(x′; z, h), (12)
where z ∼ N (0, I(d+1)×(d+1)) and h ∼ U(0, α) and the
point x′ is either equal to x (zero initialization), or x′ =
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Table 1. Performance on CIFAR-10 against ℓ∞ bounded adversarial perturbations (ε = 8/255).
Method Standard accuracy FGSM PGD7 PGD20
Standard 86.33% ± 0.42 22.09% ± 0.45 1.26% ± 0.16 0.39% ± 0.12
Adv7 70.71% ± 0.01 42.37% ± 0.27 38.52% ± 0.23 36.03%± 0.16
Adv1-scratch 83.35% ± 0.19 27.84% ± 0.12 17.55% ± 0.35 13.14% ± 0.25
Adv1-pretrain 84.23% ± 0.17 23.13% ± 0.32 12.22% ± 0.16 8.11% ± 0.06
SOAR 81.73%± 0.12 47.77% ± 0.29 39.15% ± 0.15 32.83%± 0.15
x + η (random initialization), or x′ = x + η + α∇xℓ(x +
η) (PGD1 initialization). We compare all variations in our
experiments. The hyper-parameter λ should be equal to
1 based on the derivations, though we also observed that
other values might lead to better performance.
5. Experiments
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of the proposed
regularization method. Our experiments show that training
with SOAR leads to a significant improvement in robust-
ness under white-box and black-box ℓ∞ adversarial attacks
as well as white-box ℓ2 attacks. Unlike adversarial train-
ing, SOAR achieves robustness gain without a significantly
sacrificing standard (average-case) accuracy. Our results
against black-box attacks show no sign of gradient mask-
ing.
We evaluate SOAR on the CIFAR-10 dataset where the best
defense against adversarial attacks is still adversarial train-
ing (Qin et al., 2019). We train a 4-layer CNN with ReLU
non-linearities similar to a CNN used in Kingma & Ba
(2014). Training data is augmented with random crops and
horizontal flips. The Standard model is trained using only
clean training data, for a total of 200 epochs with an ini-
tial learning rate of 0.01 and decay by an order of mag-
nitude at epoch 100 and 150. SOAR refers to continuing
the training of the Standard model with our regularizer in
Equation 11. It is trained for a total of 150 epochs with
an initial learning rate of 0.002 and decay at epoch 90 and
100. We set λ = 0.5 and α = 0.03 for the regularizer.
Adv7 is the adversarial training baseline trained only with
7-step PGD adversarial examples, it has an identical train-
ing schedule as the Standard model. All ℓ∞-PGD adversar-
ial examples used for training and evaluations are generated
with ε = 8/255 and a step size of 2/255 (pixel values are
normalized by 255 to the range [0, 1]). Additional results
against more attacks are discussed in Appendices D and E.
5.1. Robustness against White-Box Attacks
Table 1 compares the performance of SOAR to baselines
against standard accuracy and white-box adversarial at-
tacks. Training with SOAR significantly improves the ad-
versarial robustness against FGSM and PGD7 while retain-
ing a higher standard accuracy compared to Adv7. Adv7
achieves only 3.2% higher accuracy against PGD20 than
SOAR while we achieve 11% higher accuracy in stan-
dard accuracy and 5.4% higher accuracy against FGSM.
Previous works have usually attributed the drop in stan-
dard accuracy to a trade-off between accuracy and robust-
ness (Madry et al., 2017; Tsipras et al., 2018). However,
even if such trade-off exists in real datasets, these results
argue against a simply linear one.
To demonstrate that PGD1 initialization is not the primary
drive for the improved robustness, we also perform adver-
sarial training with 1-step PGD adversaries trained from
random initialization (Adv1-scratch). Since the regular-
ization is applied to pretrained models, we also include
1-step PGD adversarial training from pretrained models
(Adv1-pretrain). Both methods perform poorly against
PGD7 and PGD20 attacks that shows a failure in general-
ization to stronger attacks than ones used during training.
Table 2. Accuracy (%) against ℓ2-PGD attacks.
Method ε = 20
255
ε = 40
255
ε = 60
255
Standard 60.2± 0.1 33.7± 0.1 18.1± 0.3
Adv7 68.3± 0.1 65.6± 0.2 62.9± 0.2
SOAR 76.8± 0.1 71.3± 0.1 65.8± 0.0
We evaluate methods against ℓ2 attacks in Table 2. We use
100 iterations and a step size of 2.5ε/100 for ℓ2-PGD at-
tacks. Interestingly, we find that training with SOAR leads
to a significant robustness against ℓ2 adversaries, exceeding
Adv7 by 8.4% for ε = 20255 . This aligns with findings by
Simon-Gabriel et al. (2019), that empirically showed adver-
sarial robustness through regularization gains robustness
against more than one norm-ball attack at the same time.
5.2. Robustness against Black-Box Attacks
As shown in Athalye et al. (2018a), many defenses only
reach an illusion of robustness through methods collec-
tively known as gradient masking or gradient obfusca-
tion. These methods often fail against the attacks gener-
ated against an undefended independently trained model
known as black-box attacks. Recent works (Trame`r et al.,
2017; Ilyas et al., 2019) have developed hypotheses for the
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success of black-box attacks. Table 3 shows our results
against ℓ∞-PGD attacks with 20 iterations. In addition to
a CNN, we also test against attacks generated on ResNet18
(He et al., 2016). SOAR demonstrates significant robust-
ness compared to Adv7. These results confirm that the ro-
bustness of SOAR is not due to gradient masking.
Table 3. Accuracy (%) against black-box ℓ∞-PGD attacks (ε =
8/255).
Method\Source CNN ResNet18
Standard 18.1± 0.6 63.7 ± 0.9
Adv7 68.3± 0.1 69.9 ± 0.1
SOAR 72.6± 1.0 79.8± 0.2
6. Related Work
Adversarial training (Szegedy et al., 2013) was the first de-
fense proposed against adversarial attacks along with their
discovery. They used LBFGS to find adversarial examples
for training. Goodfellow et al. (2014) proposed the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to speed up the generation
of adversarial examples during training where an epsilon
times the sign of the gradient was used as an adversarial per-
turbation. The original experiments did not prove FGSM to
be a complete solution to adversarial attacks. Madry et al.
(2017) proposed adversarial training with iterative FGSM
also known as PGD attacks. As Schott et al. (2018) noted,
adversarial training has an important deficiency; it relies on
a choice of norm-ball that fails to gain robustness against
other norm-ball constraints. On MNIST, adversarial train-
ing with PGD does not do better than binarizing the im-
age to black and white and on CIFAR10, there is still a
significant gap between standard (average-case) accuracy
and accuracy against adversarial attacks. Even worse, the
robustness gained is at the cost of a big drop in standard
accuracy. Recently, Wong et al. (2020) argued that train-
ing with FGSM attacks can be as strong as PGD if care-
fully done. Despite the shortcomings, adversarial train-
ing is still a competitive defense on MNIST and CIFAR-
10 datasets (Hoffman et al., 2019). It is also one of the
few methods that have survived tests against gradient mask-
ing (Athalye et al., 2018a).
Given the limitations of adversarial training, various alter-
natives have been studied. Adversarial regularization meth-
ods are the most related to our proposed method. We cate-
gorize these methods based on the order of Taylor approxi-
mation to the adversarial loss. TRADE (Zhang et al., 2019)
regularizes only the output of the model and does not regu-
larize gradients or the Hessian. It was designed to encour-
age smoothness of the loss function. They added a loss for
the difference between the output of the model on a train-
ing data and its corresponding adversarial example. The
subtle difference with adversarial training is to not use the
true target label in the regularization term.
Simon-Gabriel et al. (2019) studied the first order Taylor
approximation to the adversarial loss. They proposed two
future directions, direct regularization of the norm of the
gradients as well as architectural modifications that result
in smaller norm of gradients. However, simply reducing the
norm of gradients can quickly lead to models with gradient
masking. Hoffman et al. (2019) proposed Jacobian regular-
ization by minimizing the Frobenius norm of the Jacobian.
LLR (Qin et al., 2019) is another regularization based on
the first order Taylor approximation of the adversarial loss.
In contrast, they minimize the magnitude of the projection
of gradient along a particular direction. The direction used
is the one that maximizes the error of the first order Taylor
approximation.
CURE (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2019) is the closest to our
method. They proposed directly minimizing the curvature
of the loss function. They empirically observed that ad-
versarial training leads to a reduction in the magnitude of
eigenvalues of the Hessian with respect to the input. To re-
duce the computation time and numerical challenges, they
regularized the model by the distance of gradients along the
FGSM direction.
As experiments of Qin et al. (2019) show, none of these
methods perform better than adversarial training on CIFAR-
10 dataset. Our proposed method is the first regularization
method that performs better than adversarial training on
CIFAR-10 dataset.
7. Conclusion
This work proposed SOAR, a regularizer that improves the
robustness of DNN to adversarial attacks. This is a more
explicit alternative to adversarial training. SOAR was ob-
tained using the second-order Taylor series approximation
of the loss function w.r.t. the input, and approximately solv-
ing the inner maximization of the robust optimization for-
mulation to the adversarial robustness. We showed that
training with SOAR leads to adversarial robustness, with
significant improvement in robustness under white-box and
black-box ℓ∞ adversarial attacks as well as white-box ℓ2
attacks. More importantly, SOAR achieves robustness gain
without a significant trade-off with standard accuracy.
This is only a first step in designing better regularizers to
improve the adversarial robustness. Several directions de-
serve further study. One direction is to understand the loss
surface of DNN better in order to select a good point around
which an accurate Taylor approximation can be made. This
is important for designing regularizers that are not affected
by gradient masking.
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A. Adversarial Robustness of the Model Trained using SOAR with Different Initializations
Table 4. Performance of SOAR on CIFAR-10 against ℓ∞ bounded adversarial perturbations (ε = 8/255).
Method Standard accuracy PGD20 CNN ResNet18
SOAR
- zero init 84.28% ± 0.32 71.09% ± 0.93 15.10% ± 9.83 60.85% ± 1.16
- random init 83.85% ± 0.51 73.64% ± 0.24 20.97% ± 12.46 69.71% ± 0.60
- PGD1 init 81.73% ± 0.12 32.83%± 0.15 72.62% ± 0.95 79.79% ± 0.16
We report the adversarial robustness of the model trained using SOAR with different initialization techniques in Table 4.
The third column shows the accuracy against white-box PGD20 adversaries. The fourth and the fifth columns show the
accuracy against black-box PGD20 adversaries transferred frommodels with different network designs. The source models
are independently initialized and trained with clean data.
We notice that despite the high adversarial accuracy against white-box PGD attacks, models trained using SOAR with
zero and random initialization perform poorly against transferred attacks. This suggests the presence of gradient masking
when using SOAR with zero and random initializations. Evidently, SOAR with PGD1 initialization alleviates the gradient
masking problem.
B. Potential Causes of Gradient Masking
Table 5. Average value of the highest probability output for all test set data, that is, 1
N
ΣNn=1maxi∈1,2,...,c P (xn)i, where P (xn)i
represent the probability of class i given data xn.
Method Standard Random PGD1
Standard 94.86%± 0.16 94.18%± 0.15 94.72%± 0.28
Adv7 53.81%± 0.13 53.63%± 0.14 53.81%± 0.12
Adv1-scratch 85.72%± 0.19 85.61%± 0.17 85.72%± 0.14
Adv1-pretrain 87.46%± 0.05 87.32%± 0.04 87.46%± 0.07
SOAR
- zero init 99.63%± 0.03 99.61%± 0.03 99.82%± 0.00
- random init 99.61%± 0.02 99.57%± 0.04 99.83%± 0.01
- PGD1 init 93.85%± 0.03 93.80%± 0.02 93.31%± 0.03
We summarize the average value of the highest probability output for test set data initialized with zero, random and PGD1
perturbations in Table 5. We notice that training with SOAR using zero or random initialization leads to models with nearly
100% confidence on their predictions. This is aligned with the analysis of SOAR for a linear classifier (Section 4.1), which
shows that the regularizer becomes ineffective as the model outputs high confidence predictions. Indeed, results in Table 4
show that those models are vulnerable under black-box attacks.
Recall that PGD attacks involve initializing the clean data xn with a randomly chosen η within the ℓ∞ ball of size ε,
followed by gradient ascent at xn + η. Results in Table 5 suggest that highly confident predictions could be an indication
for gradient masking. Suppose that the model makes predictions with 100% confidence on any given input. This leads to
a piece-wise loss surface that is either zero (correct predictions) or infinity (incorrect predictions). The gradient of this
loss function is either zero or undefined making gradient ascent ineffective. Therefore, white-box gradient-based attacks
are unable to find adversarial examples.
C. Model & Training Details
Hyperparameters for the CNN: The four layer CNNmodel has kernel sizes= [3, 3, 3, 3], strides= [1, 1, 1, 1], and output
channel size = [32, 32, 64, 64]. All layers use ReLU activation functions, and layer 2 and 4 are followed by max-pooling.
Standard/Adversarial training: We train the model for 200 epochs, with an initial learning rate of 0.01. We decay the
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learning rate by an order of magnitude at epoch [100, 150]. We used a minibatch size of 128 for testing and training. We
used SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9 and a weight decay of 2e-4.
Regularization with SOAR: We continue training from a pretrained the model for an additional 150 epochs, with an
initial learning rate of 0.002, and an update schedule of [90, 100]. We used a minibatch size of 128 for testing and training.
We used SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9 and a weight decay of 2e-4. The parameters for the regularizer are: λ = 0.5
and α = 8/255. We apply two types of clipping: a gradient clipping of 30 on the ℓ2 norm of regularizer gradient, and a
clipping of 10 on the value of the ℓ2 norm part of the regularizer. The primary reason for the clipping operation is that at
the beginning of the regularization, the loss gradient can be very small compared to the regularizer gradient.
Reproducibility: All necessary source code files and Jupyter notebooks are included to reproduce the results reported in
this paper.
D. Robustness under Image Transformation
Table 6. Robustness under different image transformations
Method Weak Medium Strong
Standard 83.07%± 0.09 61.19%± 1.04 35.89%± 0.64
Adv7 69.87%± 0.24 60.60%± 0.13 32.51%± 0.39
SOAR 80.51%± 0.16 68.42%± 0.47 38.04%± 0.44
To provide further evidence on the improved robustness with SOAR, we apply a more natural class of image perturbation
such as translations and rotations. Compared to the previous evaluations, this type of image corruption is fundamentally
different, because perturbations are not constrained by a specific norm metric. We consider a combination of random rota-
tions and translations with three attack strengths: weak (±10◦, ±5%px), medium: (±30◦, ±10%px), and strong: (±50◦,
±30%px). Engstrom et al. (2019) showed that the improved robustness through ℓ∞ Adv7 adversarial training is orthogo-
nal to spatial robustness, which is aligned with our results shown in Table 6. They argue that it is possibly the result of
overfitting to strong ℓ∞ adversarial examples through adversarial training. On the other hand, we notice that the improved
adversarial robustness with SOAR translates to improved robustness against such non-ℓp-bounded perturbations.
E. Robustness under Gaussian Noise
Table 7. Robustness of the model under additive Gaussian noise with different standard deviations
Method σ = 0.05 σ = 0.1 σ = 0.15
Standard 69.99%± 1.06 36.42%± 2.71 20.63%± 1.76
Adv7 69.70%± 0.25 65.52%± 0.25 58.80%± 0.36
SOAR 79.98%± 0.26 71.34%± 1.08 56.81%± 2.61
It is difficult to accurately measure model robustness with only a handful of adversarial attacks, because most attack
methods rely on using model parameters to find perturbations, particularly in the case of white-box attacks. Ford et al.
(2019) made the connection between adversarial robustness and robustness under Gaussian noise, and suggested evaluating
robustness under a known distributional shift. Here, we verify the improved robustness of the proposed regularizer under
additive d-dimensional spherical Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance. In a high dimensional space such as
the one for CIFAR-10, perturbations sampled fromN (x, σ2I) concentrate near the surface of the sphere with radius σ√d.
Robustness under additive Gaussian noise allows us to assess model robustness independent of the limiting factors of
generating adversarial examples. We report the results in Table 7. We see improvements over all methods similar to
improvements against the closely related ℓ2 attacks in Table 2. While adversarial training using strong ℓ∞ adversaries
overfits to the specific choice of the norm, regularization can improve robustness of the model in a more general sense.
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F. Additional Experiments
This appendix briefly reports the results of some additional experiments. Figures 3 shows the clean test data and PGD20
attack performance of the model under SOAR regularization during different stages of training. We report the result with
various regularization coefficient λ, cf. (12).
Figure 4 provides additional examples generated similar to that in Figure 1. We observe that when there is no curvature at
the exact centre of the Taylor series expansion, the approximation of the loss under perturbation is poor. With FD method
with a larger h, we compute the average curvature over a larger domain, and thus avoid the issue.
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Figure 3. Improvement of adversarial robustness of the model under SOAR regularization. We illustrate the improved robustness under
different λ. Top: Clean test accuracy. Bottom: Adversarial accuracy against white-box PGD20 adversaries. Recall the regularized
pointwise objective for a data point (x, y) is ℓSOAR(x, y) = ℓ(x
′, y;w) + λR(x′; z, h). Note that with λ = 0, the training objective is
equivalent to adversarial training with PGD1 adversaries.
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Figure 4. Additional examples similar to Figure 1 with different initial points.
